Computability and Cognition
Winter 2001 Final Essay
Brook Hatch 

I’m going present a moderate alternative to what I think of as extreme philosophical positions. These positions are dualism, Realism, and Functionalism. I call these extreme because each school of thought is entrenched in a set way of approaching the subject of cognition. There is little if any acknowledgement of differences in culture as pertains to cognitive functionality. I have a more flexible model in mind, one that allows for wide variances of thinking patterns and individualistic approaches to problem solving. 

Dualism
The first position to be addressed is dualism. The ideas behind dualism are older than Christian religion, perhaps older than Greco-Roman written history. René Descartes is acknowledged by many to be the father of dualism, perhaps even the father of modern philosophy. He mused on the idea that everything he experienced could be illusion created by an evil genius, everything except his doubt regarding the veracity of what he was sensing. One cannot doubt that they doubt, he reasoned, for that would be a contradiction. There is no question about the logical fallacy of contradiction. Everyone who considered themselves to be reasonable had to agree that they could be fooled by their senses. He insisted that the mind has no physical properties because the mind can’t be fooled by an evil genius except through the body which obviously has physical properties.  Furthermore he reasoned that the body is a machine connected to the mind or soul at the pineal gland. Out of Descartes’ ideas was born Substance dualism, Popular dualism, and Property dualism.
Substance dualism is the view that the mental and the physical comprise two different classes of objects: minds and bodies. Descartes cashed out the distinction between minds and bodies as follows: minds are things that think but lack spatial magnitude, and bodies are things that have spatial magnitudes, but don't think. Different substance dualists may disagree as to how best to define what's essential to being mental and physical, but they do agree that the difference in question is one of objects, not properties. My belief that the Berlin Wall was in Germany and my being six feet eight inches tall are properties of different objects, i.e., my mind and my body, respectively.
A less radical form of dualism, which Paul Churchland calls popular dualism, is the theory that the mind is literally a ‘ghost in the machine’. The mind is the spiritual, non-physical component that rides on the machine, or body component of an individual. The mind is commonly held to be inside the head, in intimate contact with the brain. This view allows for a possible undiscovered energy exchange between physical and spiritual objects. Maybe the mind is composed of this new energy. This view would allow dualism to not violate our current model of physics exemplified in the laws concerning the conservation of energy and momentum.
The view that the mental and the physical comprise two different classes of property that are both instantiated in the same objects is known as property dualism. According to property dualism, even though mental properties are totally different than physical properties, they are nonetheless all properties of the same kinds of objects. A single object instantiates the property of my being six feet eight inches tall and my believing that the Berlin Wall was in Germany. Property dualism is compatible with the token identity thesis, but not the type identity thesis (more about that later). Property dualists are typically, if not unanimously, anti-reductionists about the mental, which is to say, they deny that it is in-principle possible to translate mental predicates into physical predicates. Property dualism has another subdivision into epiphenomenalism and interactionistic property dualism.
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. They ride on top of the physical events.
The central motivation for epiphenomenalism lies in the premise that all physical events have sufficient causes that lie within the class of physical events. If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law. Descartes’ interactionist model proposed that nonphysical events could cause small changes in the shape of the pineal gland. But such nonphysical effects, however slight, would mean that the physical account of motion is false -- for that account says that there will be no such change of shape unless there is a physical force that causes it. 
In contrast to epiphenomenalism, interactionistic property dualism states that mind can influence matter and matter can influence mind. Supposing that whenever there is a mental effect in the physical world there is a corresponding physical force that is a sufficient cause of the effect. This view, however, both offends Occamist (from Ockham’s Razor) principles and fails to satisfy the leading anti-epiphenomenalist intuition, namely, that the mental makes a difference to the physical, i.e., that it leads to behavior that would not have happened in absence of the mental. The view also leads to an epistemological problem: If there is always a sufficient physical cause for behavior, then one could never be in a position where one needs to suppose there is anything further. Thus, on the assumption of physical sufficiency, there could never be any reason to introduce mental causes into one’s account of behavior. 

Realism
Realism directly opposes dualism. It uses the principle of Ockham’s razor to cut away mysticism and handwaving from the reality that underlies everything. An exemplar is the statement that if a philosophical position requires a lot of defense, then it is probably fundamentally faulty. A realist insists on there being explanations of the empirical world (including minds) in terms of the real world. Thus, a complete theory of the mind should explain the existence and functioning of minds in terms of the reality lying behind their empirically testable properties. We are constantly making assumptions about the nature of reality. Unfortunately, we don’t all agree on many of the details. One could say that it is the religious or unscientific people who are being unreasonable and not seeing the truth before their very eyes. The problem isn’t that simple because reasonable, scientific people can and do hold widely varying opinions about truth and reality. It is said that there are no facts, only opinions. Searle holds the opinion that a defense of realism is unnecessary because every attack on it is a movement based in realism. This is like saying that Satanists are really Christians because by worshipping Satan, they accept the existence of the opposite deity. Despite Searle’s assertion that realism needs no defense, he does attack the four leading criticisms of realism, perspectivism, conceptual relativity, the argument from the history of science, and the argument of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Finally I will address Searle’s challenge to skepticism.
Adherents of perspectivism stipulate that every individual approaches reality with their own perspective or mindset. This idea easily matches the satanic Christian example above. It does not debunk the assertion that there is such a thing as an external reality. Searle claims that, “Facts exist utterly independent of language.” No, facts are nothing more than assumptions backed by strong belief. The relation to language is plain. If I say the moon is made of cheese and you believe me, then it is a fact that the moon is made of cheese, if only to you. I might know that I’m lying and if the lie is discovered, then it’s no longer a fact. Oh, one could argue that facts are stronger than beliefs because they are based in knowledge, but this only further muddles the discussion. The same argument is easily applied to knowledge. If verity is desired then perhaps fifteen million people believing that something is true makes it that way. So called knowledge is little more than indoctrination. It is my opinion that adherence to a realist perspective is similar to having a mind closed by hubris.
Searle’s argument against conceptual relativity bears more weight. Conceptual relativity insists that nothing is real because different conceptual viewpoints about the same things exist. It’s not a strong argument. Having a chair thrown at my head is just as real whether I think it’s being thrown by a yeti or by a drunk bar patron. At least the effect is the same if I don’t move quickly out of the way.
Searle invokes the idea put forth by Kuhn that science hasn’t developed incrementally, but rather in a series of revolutions that challenged the assumptions of the previous paradigm. This is a strong challenge to our assurance that what we know about anything at all is true, but like Searle I don’t feel that it challenges the existence of an external reality. It does, however bring up the concept that a label is not the thing it names.
When one chooses to adhere to one theory over another, it doesn’t mean that reality is changing, but rather that one’s perspective is shifting. It has been brought to my attention that objects which I think of as having the quality of hardness are merely more densely packed molecules than other objects which I perceive of as soft. Another example is the shift from geocententric views about the universe to heliocentrism. Certainly, one model is more efficient than another in describing the movements of the heavens, but that doesn’t change the apparent movement of the sun through the sky as if it were rotating around the earth. If I say that the color of an object is red, it is not necessarily a contradiction to say that the object is reflecting light at a low frequency in the visible electromagnetic spectrum. Each perspective is useful in its domain. Usefulness is proven it’s assistance in making predictions like what color will another person see.

Functionalism
Let’s leave behind the unsolvable question of whether there is an object reality or not and enter instead a discussion about functionalism. Functionalism can be thought of as having been distilled out of behaviorism. Behaviorism hoped to show that only environmental input and behavioral output define each mental state. Functionalism denies that this is possible and insists that the structure of the internal activities is more important than the matter which sustains it. Functionalism espouses a sort of network theory of meaning in that each mental state is inseparable from other mental states to which it is causally connected.
Functionalism rejects the traditional identity theorism view that every mental state has a corresponding physical state. Identity theory seems to be caught up in inter-domain pattern matching to a credibility bending state. We are able to detect the consumption of nutrients, signifying activity in different areas of the brain. There is some evidence suggesting that certain areas of the brain govern speech, math skills, etc. However, the cybernetic quality of the brain is shown by its ability to rewire itself around damaged tissue. Experiments with monkey brains may indicate that memory is holographic. These examples cast some doubt on the veracity of mental type = physical type theories.
Strangely enough, it seems that functionalism embraces a weaker identity theory, that of mental token = physical token. Here is stated that each instance of a given mental state is numerically identical with a specific state in some physical system. This is like saying that we can’t know what dogs are but we can certainly identify a certain creature as a dog. I find rejecting one type theory and embracing token theory to be senseless. Either mental states can be tied to brain states or they cannot. You can’t have it both ways. Major branches of functionalism include Turing machine functionalism, causal theory of mind, and teleological (homuncular) functionalism.
Turing machine functionalism, proposed by Hilary Putnam, uses the Turing machine as its model. The device receives input, carries out the instructions, changes its internal state, and produces a selected output based on the input and whatever hard-coded instructions existed inside it. A vending machine shows these features as it has instructions on various acceptable inputs with various associated behavioral outputs. Perhaps if we extended the complexity of the vending machine a million fold, we might produce a probabilistic automaton that could pass as a human.
A second type of functionalism, maintained by David Armstrong and David Lewis, concerns a causal theory of mind. Mental states can be defined by a common sense understanding of the situations in which they appear and the behavior that is elicited. In his essay "Mad Pain and Martian Pain", Lewis hypothesizes about two kinds of beings which experience pain differently than normal humans. In the case of mad pain, the subject experiences pain when doing moderate exercise on an empty stomach; further it improves his concentration for mathematical reasoning. Martian pain, by contrast, takes place in a Martian organism constructed of hydraulic hardware rather than neurons. Lexis’s point is that pain is associated only contingently with either its causes (as in mad pain) or its physical realization (as in Martian pain). We cannot specify a priori its causal role or physical realization. 
A third type of functionalism, associated with William G. Lycan and Daniel Dennett, breaks mental states down into a hierarchy resembling that of a large corporation or anthill. This includes cooperating units, sub-units, sub-sub-units, and so on, until a neurological level is reached which simply reduces to a series of on-off switches. On this view, the pattern of on-off switches can be instantiated in a variety of non-biological mechanisms, such as computers. 
The main problem with all types of functionalism is that they approach mental states in a purely relational way. One criticism focuses on a hypothetical situation in which someone perceives an inverted light spectrum. For example, Albert perceives orange when Bob perceives blue. Although they both function precisely the same with regard to input, related internal states, and behavior, they clearly have different qualitative mental states. However, a functionalist might reply to this charge maintaining that what is central to functionalism is how people discriminate between colors, not their qualia. A second criticism of functionalism hypothesizes that if we could create an android which is functionally the same as a human, but lacks qualia, then functionalism would be incomplete or false. To this the functionalist might respond that we should be able to make an android out of some physical stuff which has qualia (since its type of constituent physical stuff should not make a difference). A third criticism is that functionalism is too narrow (or chauvinistic) in the kinds of things that are capable of having mental states. Specifically, functionalism seems to be dependent on physicalism, insofar as only physical things (biological, silicon, etc.) can house functional mental states. This leaves out non-physical mental beings, such as disembodied spirits. 

Individualism
Considering that curiosity is so deeply ingrained in human beings, it’s a wonder that any of us live to become adults. This curiosity is indicative of a survival technique with a deeper meaning. One of the characteristics humans have in common with other primates is neoteny, or late adolescence. This factor makes as very social creatures. We depend on each for our survival; we feed our curiosity about the world with the words of the ancients and the opinions of our contemporaries. It’s not a far stretch to smooth out the individuality that distinguishes us. A common behavior in humans is to band with like-minded others. If the group considers itself to be elite, this commonly leads to homogeneity of thinking. One naturally considers a group to number some small handful, but this homogeneity can cover many thousands and many millions of people. One prime example is the internationally known elitism of the United States Citizen. I don’t mean to indicate that Americans have a monopoly on rude, selfish behavior on foreign soil. But it is a common enough stereotype to make me consider pretending Canadian or UK citizenship when travelling abroad. Another example of this homogeneity is in the ethnocentric view we have about time. Members of industrial civilizations generally consider time to be a commodity. We fear death and rush about trying to improve our lives, usually in a vain attempt at some transient happiness that is tainted by the expectation that any moment will our wealth, privilege, power, or lives stripped callously from us.
	In order to enjoy the technological fruits of our industrial society, we are required to become rational, responsible wage earning contributors. We are allowed to have religious beliefs even if those beliefs challenge the expectations and assumptions of the culture. Faith can have negative and positive consequences. What we believe in are facts. If you think that believing the fact that zero degrees Celsius is the freezing point of water at sea level is more fundamental than a !Kung Bushmen’s belief in magical healing or an orthodox Jew’s adherence to the torah try talking them out of it. It’s a matter of domain. In many cases, what appears to be ordinary behavior is merely ‘passing’, attempting to fit in.
Consider the variations in aptitude. A poor measure of this is the Binet Intelligence Quotient test. While purporting to measure purely aptitude, it actually measures level of schooling and how closely your attitude matches that of the test designers. I have a much older metric in mind. There are four potentials in humans, analytic potential, creative power, transcendence, and body intelligence.
Individuals with a great deal of analytic potential are typically natural chess players, puzzle solvers, good at math, and clever with concepts. 
Creative power fires the imagination and fuels the creative urges of people. Dramatic, demonstrative people have the need to perform, to exhibit, or to create.
Transcendence is the ability to rise above petty self-centered concerns. One might call this the maternal or paternal instinct, if such a thing exists. I consider emotional response to be all about transcendence. At its most base and unrefined level, emotion is ugly and demanding, but when refined it is emotion that makes us desire to leave the world a better place, to give gifts and do favors for our friends without thought of recompense.
Athletes and acrobats are known to have much body intelligence. It is this source that urges people to revel in physical activity, to move with grace and power.
It could be that we are all born with equal potential, or it could be that we develop over our lifetimes, subject to environmental pressures that form us. Likely both take part in the formation of the individual psyche. 
I showed how each of the major philosophical positions in Cognitive Science is polar and inflexible. What I hope to have proven is that cognitive process are unique to every individual in the variance of methods of problem solving and thinking patterns. It’s important to realize that labels aren’t the things they name.